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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves competing hair salon businesses located in Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho. Appellant employed Respondent AMANDA SHULER (hereafter "Respondent
Shuler") and Defendants Cassie Moser, Britney Harrington, Kortni Ellett, Jara Daley and Emily
Coffin (hereafter collectively referred to herein as "Defendants" unless specified individually), in
various capacities.

In February 2011 Respondent Shuler and the Defendants all left their

employment with Appellant to start a competing hair salon business. Appellant filed suit in
Bannock County District Court alleging nine different claims and/or causes of action. 1
At the hearing on the Respondents' and Defendants' motion for summary judgment
Appellant agreed to dismiss the Defendants and kept claims only against Respondent Shuler and
EIKOV A SALON AND SPA, LLC (hereafter "Respondent Eikova"). Appellant also agreed that
it would not provide additional argument but that it would supplement the record with certain
documents. The District Court entered an Order at the hearing memorializing this agreement. 2
However, Appellant later attempted to provide additional affidavit testimony and a
supplemental brief with argument. Respondents objected and filed a motion to strike.

1
2

R. at 13-17.
R. at 263-265.

3

The District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike3 and struck the Appellants' additional affidavit testimony and its
supplemental brief and argument. 4 Further, the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Respondents and dismissed the case entirely. 5
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. 6

Respondents filed a motion and

memorandum for attorney fees and costs. 7 The District Court entered its Memorandum Decision
and Order re: Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration8 and ruled against the Appellant and in
favor of the Respondents. 9
Respondents filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Costs. 10 The District Court awarded
attorneys fees and costs to Respondents. 11
The Appellant filed an appeal on each of the District Court Decisions entered above.

3

R. at 259-275.
R. at 263-265.
5 R. at 274-275.
6 Appellant did not include this on the Clerk's record.
7 R. at 276-282.
8 R. at 291-302.
9 R. at 296-297; and 301-302.
10 R. at 303-304.
11 R. at 323.
4

4

II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each worked as employees of Appellant.
Respondent Shuler and Defendants Harrington, Dalley, Coffin, and Moser each signed a
confidentiality agreement. 12
Respondent Shuler and the individual Defendants left their employment with Appellant
in February 2011. 13 Nearly 2 years later, Appellant filed suit in Bannock County District Court
alleging nine different claims and/or causes of action against Respondent Shuler and the
Defendants individually. 14 In these claims, Appellant essentially alleged that Respondent Shuler
and the Defendants took protected or confidential information which they then used to start their
own business.
Respondent Shuler and the Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint denying the
allegations and raising affirmative defenses. 15
Plaintiff claims that the individual Defendants wrongfully took and used Plaintiffs
confidential and secret Client/Customer list, scheduling lists, client calendars, client information,
or other information in the creation and promotion of Defendant Eikova. 16 Plaintiff actually took
no effort to keep its Client/Customer list, scheduling lists, client calendars, client information, or

R.
R.
14 R.
15 R.
16 R.
12
13

at 41, 47, 54, 65 and 71.
at 41, 47, 54, 60, 65 and 71.
at 13-17.
at 26-31.
at 13-17.

5

information regarding products and other services confidential or secret in any way. Plaintiff
itself distributed its Client/Customer list, and scheduling lists openly in several ways. 17
One such instance occurred when Respondent Shuler was the recipient of a baby shower
being given by Appellant, while employed by Appellant. Prior to the baby shower, a list of
names was given to Arny Comstock-Combs, a non-employee of Appellant, so that invitations
could be sent out for the baby shower. 18
Defendant Dalley testified in her deposition that the baby shower list described above
contained a list of "family and friends" that Respondent Shuler already knew. 19 She testified that
it was a list of people that would normally come to Respondent Shuler's baby shower because
"there wouldn't be people [Respondent Shuler] wasn't familiar with." 20 When asked specifically
what information was on the baby shower list she testified that it was "the names and address of
family and friends." 21
Arny Comstock-Combs the non-employee of Appellant testified that after receiving the
baby shower list neither the Appellant, nor its owner ever asked her to return or to give back the
list of names and information that was given to her. 22 Ms. Comstock-Combs further testified that

17

R.
R.
19 R.
20 R.
21 R.
22 R.
18

at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
at 36-39.
at 200 (deposition page 15, lines 5-19; and page 16 lines 2-8).
at 200 (deposition page 15, lines 5-19).
at 200 (deposition page 16, lines 6-8).
at 36-39.

6

neither the Appellant, nor its owner ever asked her to keep the list of names and information
confidential in any way. 23
Additionally, Respondent Shuler and the individual Defendants each testified that while
they were employed by Appellant, it was the common practice of Appellant's employees to leave
printed copies of Client/Customer list, client information and scheduling lists out on the front
desk, in their work areas and/or on the break room table where people who were not employed
by Appellant, including customers, friends and/or families of the employees, could pick up, look
• 24
· or even takre a copy at any time.
at, review
Additionally, Respondent Shuler and the individual Defendants each testified that it was
also the practice of Appellant to have its employees prepare a written schedule for each day and
to have the written schedule taped up or sitting out at their work station area. Any person
receiving services during that day, or any family or friends who happened to be in the salon
could see the names and information of the customers who were scheduled for services for that
day. 25 Appellant through the owner saw these things happening and never took any action to
· 26
correct 1t.

Any employee who worked for Plaintiff for any period of time would also easily learn the
names and many times the addresses and phone numbers of most if not all of Plaintiffs clients

R. at 36-39.
R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
25 R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
26 R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
23

24

7

and customers.

Many of Appellants clients and customers were the family, friends or

acquaintances of Plaintiffs employees.
Up to the date each individual Defendant left her employment with Plaintiff, they worked
hard at their job to benefit Plaintiff.

The individual Defendants even helped train other

employees of Plaintiff prior to leaving so that Plaintiffs business would continue to operate
normally. The Defendants each left their employment with Plaintiff for varying reasons. The
most common reason was simple dissatisfaction with their employment and a desire to improve
their skills and to have new opportunities in their profession. 27
Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each testified that when they left their
employment with Appellant, none of them ever actively sought to harm Appellant's business in
any way. Further, each testified that none of them had in their possession or had taken, e-mailed,
copied, stolen or used any Client/Customer list, scheduling lists, client calendars, client
information, or any other information of any type in any form from Appellant for any of the
advertising that has been done to promote Defendant Eikova. 28
Rather, Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each testified that they worked together
on their own time to generate a list of individuals to advertise to. This included listing names,
phone numbers, and addresses of people they personally knew; had as contact information in
their cell phones or e-mail contacts; could obtain from church membership directories and lists;

27
28

R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
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from their social media contacts; from suggestions from family, friends, and acquaintances and
also from phone books and online directories and searches for individual's contact information. 29
None of the Defendants specifically targeted or solicited only Appellant's customers or
clients. Rather, Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each testified that they used general
advertising to the public broadly by sending out mass mailings and by print advertising and
social media. 30
Other methods of advertising and promotion used by the Defendants included
participating in fundraisers for local high schools, for Idaho State University and participating in
craft shows in Soda Springs and Pocatello. 31
Once Respondent Eikova was operating Respondent Shuler and the Defendants also
promoted the business by utilizing referral cards; customer referrals; and by promoting the new
salon in all of their social circles and at every public event or venue that they or their families
participated in. The Defendants found that word of mouth was one of the best ways for them to
get new clients and to let previous clients know where Defendant Eikova was located. 32

29

R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
31 R. at 53-58, and 64-69.
32 R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
30

9

Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each specifically testified that none of them ever
took any action with the intent of harming Appellant or "stealing" Appellant's clients or driving
Appellant out of business, or even "interfering" with Appellant's business. 33
Never at any time either prior to or after leaving their employment with Plaintiff did any
of the Defendants ever hold any meetings with each other or any persons or third parties where
they conspired to injure Plaintiff or Plaintiffs business, or to drive Plaintiff out of business or to
interfere with Plaintiffs business in any way. 34 After creating and beginning the business,
Respondent Shuler' s and the Defendants' sole focus was on working hard and providing the best
services to their clients that they could. 35
After completing discovery Respondents and the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment against the Appellant challenging every allegation and claim raised in Appellant's
Complaint.
In an effort to survive summary judgment, Appellant provided several affidavits with
testimony from patrons or customers.

These affidavits are from Angela Burgett, Margaret

Beatty, Deborah Cranson, Elizabeth Jackson, and Lorrie White. 36 The testimony from each of
these patrons or customers is virtually identical. They each claim that their phone numbers and
contact information is confidential and not located in any phone book or directory. They also

R.
R.
35 R.
36 R.
33

34

at 40-45, 46-52,
at 40-45, 46-52,
at 40-45, 46-52,
at 77-79, 84-86,

53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
87-89, 90-93, and 94-96.
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each claim that the only way Respondents could have obtained or gathered their information is if
they took it from Appellant. 37 None of these individuals provides any specific facts or evidence
showing that Respondent Shuler or any of the Defendants actually took any information from
Appellant.
Appellant also provided the Affidavits of current employees Jodi Espindola, and
Christina Entzel each of whom testify that Appellant always kept client list confidential. 38
Appellant's owner also provided an Affidavit claiming that she never authorized that any client
lists be distributed in any way outside of the business. 39
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment two significant things happened.
First, Appellant agreed to dismiss each of the Defendants individually from the lawsuit stating
that it was only maintaining claims against Respondent Shuler and Respondent Eikova and that it
voluntarily dismissed all other causes of action against the Respondents except its claims for a
violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act and for breach of the confidentiality agreement. 40
Second, Appellant asked the District Court for an opportunity to provide additional documents to
the record for consideration in the summary judgment proceedings.

After the Respondents

objected to any additional briefing or argument, Appellant specifically agreed at the hearing that

37

R. at 77-79, 84-86, 87-89, 90-93, and 94-96.
R. at 186-188, and 190-193.
39 R. at 194-202.
40 R. at 259-260.
38
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it would only provide the documents to the District Court and that it would not file any
additional briefing or argument. 41
The District Court entered an oral Order from the bench at the hearing memorializing
Appellant's dismissal of the Defendants, the dismissal of all causes of action against the
Respondents except those that were noted, and its specific agreement that it would provide no
additional briefing or argument. The District Court made a vvritten record of Appellant's actions
and agreement in its Memorandum Decision. 42
After the summary judgment hearing, Appellant provided additional documents to the
record. However, Appellant also went against its specific agreement and attempted to provide to
the District Court additional affidavit testimony and a supplemental brief containing additional
argument.

Respondents objected and filed a motion to strike these affidavits and the

supplemental brief.
On November 28, 2013, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 43 The District Court struck from the
record Appellants' additional affidavit testimony and its supplemental brief and arguments citing
to its previous oral Order and the specific agreement Appellants made during the summary
judgment hearing that no additional argument or briefing would be filed. 44

R. at 263-265.
R. at 263-265.
43 R. at 259-275.
44 R. at 263-265.
41

42
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Further, in this Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court found that
Respondents Shuler and Eikova had provided facts evidencing that no breach of any
confidentiality agreement or violation of the Idaho Trade Secret Act had occurred. Specifically,
the District Court determined two things from the record: First, it reviewed the record and
determined that Appellant had only provided conjecture, assumptions, beliefs and assertions in
opposition to the actual testimony provided by Respondent Shuler and the Defendants
concerning how Respondent Eikova's client list was created. 45

Second, the District Court

determined that since Appellant had not provided sufficient evidence in the first place to satisfy
the elements required under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act there could be no breach of a
confidentiality agreement. 46 Based upon this the District Court ruled in favor of the Respondents
and dismissed the case. 47
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. 48

Respondents filed a motion and

memorandum for attorney fees and costs. 49
On February 3, 2014, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. 50 Again the District Court ruled against the Appellant
and in favor of the Respondents finding specifically that Appellant had only provided,

45

R. at 272-273.
R. at 273-274.
47 R. at 274-275.
48 It is interesting to note that Appellant did not include this on the Clerk's record because it did
not want this Court to review its arguments.
49 R. at 276-282.
50 R. at 291-302.
46

13

speculation and conjecture rather than any specific facts or evidence to show that either the Idaho
Trade Secrets Act was violated or that a breach of the confidentiality agreement ever occurred. 51
The District Court also ruled that the "newly acquired evidence" that Appellant claimed to have
submitted wasn't new at all.

Rather, the Court directed Appellant to its previous decision

granting summary judgment to Respondents and cited to where it had considered everything the
Appellant was claiming was new. 52
After receiving the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order re: Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration, the Respondents filed its Supplemental Memorandum of Costs. 53
On April 8, 2014, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Attorney Fees. The District Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Respondents finding
that under I.R.C.P. 54(3), Idaho Code 12-120(3) and previous Idaho Supreme Court decisions
that the claims brought by Appellant against the Respondents were a commercial transaction. 54
As a result, the District Court awarded attorneys fees and costs to Respondents. 55

51

R.
R.
53 R.
54 R.
55 R.
52

at 296-297; and 301-302.
at 298-300.
at 303-304.
at 317-318.
at 323.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Appellant m the
Appellants' Brief:
1.

Whether the District Court properly struck the additional affidavits and argument
filed by Appellant?

2.

Whether the District Court properly found that no dispute of material fact existed
on the record when granting summary judgment against Appellant?

3.

Whether the District Court properly awarded attorney fees to the Respondents and
the Defendants?

In addition, Respondents identify the following issue on appeal: Whether Respondents
are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
LC.§ 12-121(3), and LR.C.P. 54(e)(l). A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a breach of an employment contract. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 626,
778 P.2d 744, 748 (Idaho 1989). Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are
considered commercial transactions, subject to the attorney fee provision of LC. § 12-120(3).

Oakes v. Boise Hear Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 547, 272 P.3d 512, 519 (2012).
The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision that "[w]here a party alleges the
existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim

15

triggers the application of [LC. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing party may recover fees even though
no liability under a contract was established." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d
608, 615 (2011), citing, Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772
(1994).
In the present case, in its complaint, the Appellant specifically alleged that Respondent
Shuler and each of the individual Defendants "violated her non-compete agreement, her
confidentiality agreement, her duty of loyalty, her fiduciary duty and her obligation of good faith
and fair dealing." 56 In its appeal, the Appellant still claims and maintains that Respondent Shuler
breached her Confidentiality Agreement. Thus, at all stages in this litigation, including the
present appeal, the Appellant is making claims involving employment contracts and employment
relationships between it and Respondent Shuler. As the case law cited above demonstrates, any
claims or disputes involving an employment contract trigger a right to an award of attorney fees
as a commercial transaction pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3).
For these reasons, and grounds, and based upon the uncontroverted record and the
applicable law set forth above, Respondents respectfully requests that it be awarded all of its
reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3), and LR.C.P. 54(e)(l).

56

R. at 13-17, specifically paragraphs 27-32.
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STANDARD OF REVIE,v AND ARGUMENT

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

The summary judgment rendered by the District Court in favor of the Respondents and
Defendants was proper. Summary Judgment is appropriate when" ... the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law." State
v. Rubbermaid, 129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,
530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a
genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than just
conclusory assertions, or assumptions or beliefs that an issue of material fact exists. Van Velson
Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, (1994). "Rather, the
[opposing party] must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d
473,478 (1994).
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element
essential to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial. This
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56( c) of the

17

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 56(c). See, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1998). In Cellotex, Justice Renquist
wrote for the majority and explained:
The plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter oflaw ... 477 U.S. at 322-323.
As a result of Cellotex, the Appellant in this case cannot raise merit-less claims to defeat
Summary Judgment. Rather the Appellant must introduce or point to facts in the record that
support each element of each claim asserted in Appellant's Second Amended Complaint.
In the present case the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Respondents and the Defendants. Respondent Shuler and the individual Defendants all testified
and provided evidence on the record as to the specific ways that they created and used a client
list in the operation of Respondent Eikova. All of the methods used and described on the record
were lawful and did not violate any confidentiality agreement or the Idaho Trade Secrets Act.
In response, Appellant provided no evidence on the record upon which the District Court
could rely to refute the evidence provided by the Respondents and Defendants.

Appellant

provided several affidavits but these only provided conjecture, assertions, assumptions and
beliefs concerning how Respondents' client list was created.

18

The District Court properly recognized that Appellant had failed to meet its burden of
"showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." The District Court properly found
that Appellant had provided no facts or evidence on the record to contradict the evidence
provided by the Respondents and awarded summary judgment in favor of Respondents.
Further, the District Court properly struck Appellant's attempt to provide additional
briefs and arguments citing to the Appellants own agreement and the District Court's previously
entered Oral Order memorializing that agreement. Finally, the District Court properly found that
Appellants claims triggered an attorney award in favor of Respondents and the Defendants
pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e). For these reasons, all of Appellant's claims in
its Complaint fail, there are no remaining valid causes of action for Appellant to pursue, and the
dismissal Appellant's Complaint and this litigation by the District Court was proper.

II.

THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE WAS PROPER
The District Court properly granted Respondents' motion to strike. The Idaho Supreme

Court "applies an abuse of discretion standard when determining whether testimony [or
evidence] offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible." Gem State
Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). "A trial court does not abuse
its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an
exercise ofreason." Shea v. Kevic Corp.,328 P.3d 520, 524,2014 Ida. LEXIS 176, 4-5, 2014 WL

19

2854710 (Idaho2014) citing, Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271, 281 P.3d at 108 (quoting O'Connor v.
Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)).

The present case is unique because while it does contain the granting of a motion to strike
by the District Court, the basis for its granting is different than most cases. In most cases a
motion to strike is filed to challenge the evidence in a pleading on the basis of hearsay or lack of
foundation or so forth. However, in this case, the basis for the motion to strike is an agreement
made by the Appellant on the record and an Order entered by the District Court memorializing
this agreement.
While in the summary judgment hearing, Appellant asked the District Court for an
opportunity to provide additional documents to the record for consideration in the summary
judgment proceedings. The Respondents did not object to this. However, the Respondents did
object on the record to Appellant's filing any additional argument.

The District Court

specifically asked Appellant about this objection. In response Appellant specifically agreed at on
the record that it would only provide the supplemental documents to the District Court and that it
would not file any additional briefing or argument. 57
The District Court entered an oral Order from the bench at the hearing memorializing
Appellant's specific agreement that it would provide no additional briefing or argument.

57

R. at 263-265.

20

Additionally, the District Court made a written record of Appellant's actions and agreement in its
Memorandum Decision. 58
After the summary judgment hearing, Appellant provided the supplemental documents to
the record. However, Appellant also violated its specific agreement and attempted to provide to
the District Court additional affidavit testimony and a supplemental brief containing additional
argument. Based upon the previous agreement, Respondents objected and filed a motion to
strike these affidavits and the supplemental brief.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion
to Strike, the District Court specifically reviewed the facts listed above and noted that they were
on the record. The District Court stated that the supplemental documentation was allowed into
the record. The District Court then struck the additional affidavits and argument citing to the
applicable rules but more importantly by citing to the agreement made by Appellant. 59
Appellants now claim that "[t]he [District] Court refused to consider the Supplemental
Affidavit and the Supplemental Documentation. This was an err by the [District] Court in that
the [District] Court had ordered that the additional materials be allowed, but then found a reason
to strike it from the record." 60 Appellant's argument is misleading. The additional materials
were in fact allowed by the District Court as was agreed upon by Appellant and were not struck

R. at 263-265.
R. at 263-265.
60 Appellant's Brief page 22.

58

59
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from the record.

61

The only thing struck from the record was the additional testimony and

argument provided by the Appellant in violation of its own agreement.
The Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. In this motion the Appellant actually
provided additional affidavits and made all of the additional arguments that it tried to make
during the summary judgment proceedings but which the District Court struck.

In its

Memorandum Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court again reviewed the
evidence that was presented and its decision to strike the additional arguments Appellant
attempted to make in the summary judgment proceedings. 62 The District Court then specifically
indicated that even with the new affidavits and argument Appellant had still failed to provide any
"new evidence" that would alter the District Court's decision. 63
The District Court's decision to strike additional affidavits and argument in the summary
judgment proceedings was proper because it was based on the Appellant's own agreement.
Further, even if the District Court's granting of the motion to strike was improper, the Appellant
actually did provide its additional affidavits and arguments in its motion for reconsideration.
The District Court reviewed everything the Appellant had filed and properly ruled that no new
evidence had been submitted and upheld its previous decision granting summary judgment in
favor of Respondents and dismissing the lawsuit. For these reasons, the District Court's rulings

61

The documentation that was allowed into the record is at R. at 142-185 and 237-239.
R. at 295-296.
63 R. at 295, 296, 299, and 301.
62
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were correct, should be upheld by this Court and Appellants' appeal on this matter should be
denied.

III.

APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MEET ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDEN

In addition to denying the appeal on the motion to strike, this Court should also deny
Appellant's appeal on the motion for summary judgment. The standard for summary judgment
is set forth above and will not be restated here. Appellant's claims on the Idaho Trade Secrets
Act and breach of confidentiality agreement will be analyzed separately below.

A. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE IDAHO TRADE SECRETS ACT

The evidence on the record supports the District Court's decision that the Respondents
did not violate Idaho's Trade Secrets Act. In order to prevail in a misappropriation action under
the Idaho Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), the plaintiff must show that a trade secret actually existed.
See LC. § 48-801. "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if the
defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734 (Idaho 1999).
Tue ITSA sets forth the following definition: (5) "Trade secret" means information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer program, device, method, technique or
process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are
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reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Id. at 133 Idaho 734-35, citing, LC.
§ 48-801(5)(a)-(b).

Courts in Uniform Trade Secrets Act jurisdictions often apply factors from the
Restatement in order to facilitate application of the tests embodied in the statute. Basic Am., 133
Idaho at 735. The Restatement offers six additional factors that are used to determine whether
information qualifies as a trade secret: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside
[the employer's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved
in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and his competitors; (5) the amount
of effort or money expended by the employer in developing the information; and (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. Basic

Am., 133 Idaho at 735. All of these factors address the issue of whether the information in
question is generally knO\:vn or readily ascertainable.
It is important to note that trade secret misappropriation law inherently involves

balancing between the competing interests of employers and employees. Former employees
should not be deprived of using their experience, skill and knowledge in seeking future
employment. Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 738.
In Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898, 243 P.3d 1069, 1076
(2010) the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether actual misappropriation, as
defined by LC. § 48-801(2), occurred.

The Court reiterated its previous ruling that "the

legislature did not intend the statute to be read so broadly as to preclude the hiring of an
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employee from a competitor; the legislature also did not intend that merely hiring a competitor's
employee constitutes acquiring a trade secret." Id. at 898, 243 P.3d at 1076, citing, Northwest
Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, Inc., 136 Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002). Instead,
"[a]n employee will naturally take with her to a new company the skills, training, and knowledge
she has acquired from her time with her previous employer. This basic transfer of information
cannot be stopped, unless an employee is not allowed to pursue her livelihood by changing
employers." Id.
In the present case, the evidence before the Court illustrates that no trade secret exists and
thus no violation of the ITSA could have occurred. The reason that no trade secret exists is that
the information used by the Respondents and Defendants was not taken from the Appellant but
was derived by other means. Examples of this that are supported by the record will be discussed
individually below.
The "baby-shower" list is an example of information used by the Respondents and
Defendants that was not a trade secret. Appellant argues in its Appellant's Brief at length about
the "baby-shower" list in an attempt to show how its use somehow violated the ITSA. However,
the record simply does not support Appellant's arguments. The facts on the record are that a list
of people was created for Respondent Shuler' s baby shower. Defendant Dalley testified in her
deposition that the baby shower list described above contained a list of "family and friends" that

25

Respondent Shuler already knew. 64 She testified that it was a list of people that would normally
come to Respondent Shuler' s baby shower because "there wouldn't be people [Respondent
Shuler] wasn't familiar with."65 When asked specifically what information was on the baby
shower list she testified that it was "the names and addresses of family and friends." 66
Nothing in the baby shower list violates the ITSA because it only contained information
that was already "readily ascertainable." Nothing in the record refutes this.
Another example is the client names and contact information used by Respondents before
and during the time that Respondent Eikova opened for business.

Respondents and the

Defendants each individually testified that they did not take any confidential information from
Appellant.

Rather, Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each testified that they worked

together on their own time to generate a list of individuals to advertise to. This included listing
names, phone numbers, and addresses of people they personally knew; had as contact
information in their cell phones or e-mail contacts; could obtain from church membership
directories and lists; from their social media contacts; from suggestions from family, friends, and
acquaintances and also from phone books and online directories and searches for individual's
contact information. 67

R. at 200 (deposition page 15, lines 5-19; and page 16 lines 2-8).
R. at 200 (deposition page 15, lines 5-19).
66 R. at 200 (deposition page 16, lines 6-8).
67 R. at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.

64
65
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None of the Defendants specifically targeted or solicited only Appellant's customers or
clients. Rather, Respondent Shuler and the Defendants each testified that they used general
advertising to the public broadly by sending out mass mailings and by print advertising and
social media. 68
Other methods of advertising and promotion used by the Defendants included
participating in fundraisers for local high schools, for Idaho State University and participating in
craft shows in Soda Springs and Pocatello. 69
Once Respondent Eikova was operating Respondent Shuler and the Defendants also
promoted the business by utilizing referral cards; customer referrals; and by promoting the new
salon in all of their social circles and at every public event or venue that they or their families
participated in. The Defendants found that word of mouth was one of the best ways for them to
get new clients and to let previous clients know where Defendant Eikova was located. 70
When challenged with this testimony and evidence at summary judgment, Appellant
provided several affidavits with testimony from patrons or customers. These affidavits are from
Angela Burgett, Margaret Beatty, Deborah Cranson, Elizabeth Jackson, and Lorrie White. 71 The
testimony from each of these patrons or customers is virtually identical. They each claim that
their phone numbers and contact information is confidential and not located in any phone book

R.
R.
70 R.
71 R.

68
69

at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
at 53-58, and 64-69.
at 40-45, 46-52, 53-58, 59-63, 64-69, and 70-76.
at 77-79, 84-86, 87-89, 90-93, and 94-96.
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or directory.

They also each claim that the only way Respondents could have obtained or

gathered their information is if they took it from Appellant. 72 None of these individuals provides
any specific facts or evidence showing that Respondent Shuler or any of the Defendants actually
took any information from Appellant.
Appellant also provided the Affidavits of current employees Jodi Espindola, and
Christina Entzel each of whom testify that Appellant always kept client list confidential. 73
Appellant's owner also provided an Affidavit claiming that she never authorized that any client
lists be distributed in any way outside of the business. 74
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision re: Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike and in its Memorandum Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration correctly
found that nothing provided on the record by Appellant rose above conjecture, assertion, belief
or assumption. There was nothing concrete that created any dispute of the material facts place
don the record by the Respondents and Defendants.
Nothing has changed in Appellant's argument. Even in it's own Appellant's Brief the
Appellant can do nothing more than describe its own evidence as "circumstantial". 75 Further, the
Appellant can only argue that Respondent Eikova's clients "could have only come from
confidential information." The Appellant asks this Court to allow a jury to decide an issue of

R. at 77-79, 84-86, 87-89, 90-93, and 94-96.
R. at 186-188, and 190-193.
74 R. at 194-202.
75 Appellant's Brief page 9 and 12.
72

73
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fact that the Appellant itself can only provide conjecture, assertion, belief or assumption. This
type of case with no evidence existing to create a dispute of material fact is exactly the type of
case summary judgment is designed to resolve. The District Court did just that. Not only in its
original decision but also a second time after Appellant filed its motion for reconsideration.
The record before this Court is not in dispute. The Appellant failed to provide evidence
sufficient to survive summary judgment. For these reasons this Court should deny this appeal.

B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT BREACH A CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

In addition to there being no violation of the ITSA, the undisputed facts set forth on the
record evidence is that there has been no breach of any confidentiality agreement.

Simply

alleging that a party has violated a confidentiality agreement is not enough. There must be
evidence of some type of misappropriation of trade secrets in order for a breach of a
confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement to have occurred. When there is no evidence of
misappropriation of a trade secret, there can be no violation of the non-disclosure/confidentiality
agreement. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 841 (Idaho 2002).
In the present case, it should be noted first that Respondent Eikova never entered into a
confidentiality agreement. As is set forth above, Appellant seems to claim that because the
individual Defendants left Appellant's employment and then worked for Respondent Eikova, that
Respondent Eikova itself somehow violated the ITSA. However, given the law in Idaho this
cannot be the case. As is set forth above in Northwest Bee-Corp, the legislature did not intend
that merely hiring a competitor's employee constitutes acquiring a trade secret. Id. at 840, 41
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P.3d at 268. Assuming that a trade secret actually somehow existed in favor of the Appellant at
any time, there has to be something more than just having the Appellant's previous employees
now work for Respondent Eikova that constitutes a violation of the ITSA. The record reflects
that nothing more happened. Thus even if a trade secret did somehow exist in this case, there is
simply no evidence of a violation of the ITSA Respondent Eikova. \Vith no violation of a
protected trade secret, there can be no violation of any confidentiality agreement.
Furthermore, concerning Respondent Shuler individually, Appellant must first show that
she actually misappropriated a protected trade secret of the Appellant in order for a breach of the
confidential nondisclosure agreement to have occurred. As is set forth in section A. above, the
record before the Court evidences that no violation occurred. Respondent Shuler and all of the
individual Defendants provided testimony as evidence on the record that none of them ever took
any client information or did anything that would violate the ITSA. 76
Based upon the facts on the record before the Court, there was no violation of the ITSA
by Respondent Shuler or any of the individual Defendants. Additionally, Defendant Eikova
could not violate the ITSA just by hiring Appellant's previous employees even if a violation of
the ITSA had occurred. For these reasons, Appellant's claims that the Respondents breached a
confidentiality agreement should be dismissed and this appeal should be denied.

76

See Argument is in Section A. above.
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IV.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO RESPONDENT \VAS PROPER
The District Court's award of attorney fees to the Respondents and Defendants was

proper. A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of an employment
contract. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 626, 778 P.2d 744, 748 (Idaho
1989).

Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are considered commercial

transactions, subject to the attorney fee provision of LC. § 12-120(3). Oakes v. Boise Hear
Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,547,272 P.3d 512, 519 (2012). This Court reaffirmed
its previous decision that "[w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a
type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [LC. § 12-120(3)]
and a prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was
established." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011), citing, Farmers
Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (l 994)(italics added).
In the present case, in its complaint, the Plaintiff specifically alleged that Respondent
Shuler and each of the individual Defendants "violated her non-compete agreement, her
confidentiality agreement, her duty of loyalty, her fiduciary duty and her obligation of good faith
and fair dealing." 77
In the present case, there are no genuine issues of fact concerning the failure of the causes

of action and claims made by the Appellant against the Respondents and the individual

77

R. at 13-17, Paragraphs 27-32.
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Defendants \\rith the District Court. The District Court dismissed all of Appellant's claims and
dismissed the lawsuit.
The Appellant argues that attorney fees shouldn't be awarded because it voluntarily
dismissed all of the Defendants except Respondents Shuler and Eikova. However, this only
occurred at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that was filed by the Respondents
and the individual Defendants. There is no evidence on the record that Appellant can rely upon
showing that it would have dismissed these Defendants anyway but for the challenges made to
its allegations through the motion for summary judgment that had been filed. Further, all of the
causes of action, claims and allegations in Appellants Complaint were general as to all of the
Defendants. 78 There was no separation of claims by the Appellant against different Defendants.
Additionally, Appellant ignores the case law provided by Respondents. This is set forth
more fully above. Simply put, this is the exact type of case that this Court has declared attorney
fees could and would be awarded in under LC. 12-120(3). For these reasons, Respondents
respectfully request that this Court uphold the District Court's award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the District Court's Decisions
granting summary judgment and denying Appellant's motion for reconsideration in favor of the
Respondents be affirmed in their entirety and that Respondents be granted their attorney fees and
costs on appeal.

78

R. at 13-17.
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DATED this 23 rd day of September, 2014.
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED

Lv.f;Jl

LANE V. ERICKSON, of the firm
Attorneys for Respondents
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